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EVOLUTION OF MILITARY STRATEGY IN AFRICAN STATES

BY

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EVOLUTION OF MILITARY STRATEGY IN AFRICAN STATES

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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
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ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EVOLUTION OF MILITARY STRATEGY IN AFRICAN STATES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The armies of Africa have been gradually evolving toward more professional and capable armed forces. Focusing on this evolution, this study attempts to assess the evolution of African armies from the pre-colonial period to the present, to analyze future military challenges and to project a strategy to meet these challenges.

Up to now, much of the literature assessing African armies has been concerned with the political role of the army within various countries, socio-economic motivations for the politicization of the military, and the army's susceptibility to Eastern and Western influences, especially through the provision of military assistance. Sparse attention has been given to the role of the military as an actor on the international scene. The significance of African armies for the international relations of Africa has been obscured or ignored.

A common error for those unfamiliar with the countries of Africa is to take their military establishments at face value. There is a tendency to overemphasize the negative side of the African military, that is, to describe the shortcomings of African armies in excruciating detail, or to discount them as a factor in international relations altogether. The danger here is that analysis heavily weighted on the negative can obscure positive development.

CHAPTER II

ANALYTICAL FOUNDATION

African armies have been changing since independence and have now reached a watershed where in many states the military are becoming credible national forces. Back in 1966, however, little change was perceptible. Events since 1964 have served to illustrate the essential military weakness of the independent African states. By 1980, however, it was apparent to many that the small, lightly armed forces inherited from the colonial administration were being armed rapidly.[1]

As two strategic analysts have recently written, "All sovereign states have four fundamental national interests in common: survival, territorial integrity, maintenance and enhancement of economic well-being, and the promotion of a favorable world order."[2] By juxtaposing the interests and events in Africa since independence, it is possible to provide an analytical foundation for understanding the evolving role and structure of African armies.

Survival. In general terms, survival connotes protection from eradication of the population, culture, and political system of a nation. Survival also protects a nation from inclusion in a larger organization (thus eliminating independence and sovereignty), or from fundamental change or distortion. Thus the concern is not just preservation of the lives of citizens, but of the particular way those lives are led.

African armies symbolize and preserve the independence and sovereignty of Africa states. Granted, this is an independence that was extended by former colonial powers and accepted by international organizations and the world community. However, the use of force by threatening regional powers, such as Libya and South Africa, and of numerous liberation groups has put into question the ability of African armies to serve as reliable preservers of national sovereignty and protectors of existing regimes.

Territorial Integrity. Violations of boundaries, airspace, and maritime territorial limits abound in Africa as military forces pursue insurgents, impose a semblance of regional hegemony by intimidating neighbors, attempt to control access to natural resources, or deliberately attempt to destabilize or upset neighboring regimes.[3] It is a measure of the growth of African military capabilities that such incidents, and the conflicts that they cause, are increasing. Despite the impotence of their states, African armies are increasingly capable of engaging irredentist, secessionist, and neighboring forces that violate the boundaries inherited from the colonial powers and honored by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). They are equally capable of initiating such incidents.

Regional powers are beginning to have the capabilities to redraw African boundaries to meet their own ideological, economic, or political objectives or to simply dominate their neighbors to such an extent that they can reap the economic benefits without paying the political cost of incorporating neighboring states into a new political entity.

Economic Well-Being. Internal economic crises are most often seen as the principal immediate and long-term threats to African state survival and territorial integrity. African access to world markets in order to export products and import the necessities of development depend on the ability to extract raw materials and transport them to markets. The absence of conflict is a pre-requisite for trade and investment. Conflict cripples the fragile economies of many African states and endangers their vital national interests.

There are two other military dimensions of the economic problem worth noting. The first is the growing demand by African armies for more sophisticated arms to deter or combat perceived external threats. The high cost and requirements for equipment and skilled manpower can have a debilitating effect on the economy. In fact, the costs of defending the economic interests of a state against internal threats may be greater than the benefits such a defense provides. This delicate balance must be maintained by all states but is absolutely critical in Africa.

A second consideration is the role of the military in economic development. The military plays four vital roles in the pursuit of national security in developing countries. First, it represents national sovereignty. Second, it is charged with external security, protecting the nation from outside threats to its territory and interests. Third, it maintains internal security, in lieu of, or in conjunction with, existing police forces. Finally, it engages in "nation-building" or civic action activities that either enhance its relations with society or, at

4

best, keep it busy during peacetime. It has been suggested that African states may require two forces: a professional, warfighting organization, modeled on those of other states, and a paramilitary civic action force built on a model similar to those found in Israel and Indonesia.

Favorable World Order. A "new international economic order" would form a part of a more favorable world situation for African states. However, the ability of African states to cooperate among themselves economically, politically, and militarily appears to be a prerequisite to such a goal. By enhancing solidarity among African nations and other Third World states, there exists the possibility for development of a more effective, coherent bloc in international forums such as the United Nations (UN). An African High Command or an inter-African force for peacekeeping may promote such solidarity as well as enhance the image of Africa as a stable region for investment. Moreover, protracted conflict, such as that in southern Africa, preempts such cooperation, undermining the unity and image of African solidarity in the UN and other forums. Nevertheless, these supra-national goals represent a common Africa hope for a more favorable world order and, as such, raise a central dilemma. Because African states are embroiled in intra-African disputes and rivalries, the prospects for regional and continental solidarity seem remote. Yet it is in such unity that the full political and economic potential of Africa lies. Disunity and competition are not peculiarly African, nor are the calls for unity and cooperation. But in a rich continent full of

5

poor countries, unity and cooperation appear to be the only means of resolving regional conflict short of armed force.

ENDNOTES

1.   William G. Thom, Sub-Saharan Africa's Changing Military Environment, p. 2.

2.   Bruce E. Arlinghaus and Pauline H. Baker, African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities, pp. 3-7.

3.   Bruce E. Arlinghaus, Military Development in Africa: The Political and Economic Risks of Arms Transfers, p. 5.

CHAPTER III

EVOLUTION OF AFRICAN ARMIES

By examining African armies and their performance and potential for the promotion of national interests, it is possible to explain much of their past performance and to project some future trends. To effectively extrapolate these trends, it is necessary to discover their roots, tracing the path of African armed forces from independence to a growing need for greater military capabilities in the face of increased conflicts.

Colonial Legacy. Under the colonial domination, African armed forces were used in various ways as each colonial power had its own military traditions and practices.[4] African troops were recruited and trained to serve European ends, quell indigenous resistance, and maintain internal order. What marked the colonial period was "Armies of Africans" rather than "African Armies." They were constituted to serve colonial objectives, frequently outside their own societies. In World War I, 845,000 "natives," including 181,000 Tirailleurs Senegalais, fought in the French armies. In World War II, 166,000 men from British-ruled Africa and 141,000 from French-ruled Africa completed military service in the armed forces of the colonial power outside their home territories. The Belgians created the Force Publique in 1888. With independence, many armed forces lacked well-defined roles in the new states, were identified with the former colonial powers, and thus seemed largely irrelevant in the new regimes.

Growth Trends and Effects. Since independence, African

nations have undergone significant changes in the size of their

armies (see Table 1) and the increase in modern weaponry.[5] In

response to not only internal security needs but also to increas-

ing internal threats, what were mainly small constabulary forces,

limited to aintain internal order, have become, in many

instances, larger and more modern military organizations and

regional powers. The African military has evolved from lightly

armed infantry units into mechanized forces (see Table 2) and

emerging air (see Table 3) and sea forces. Through the acquisi-

tion of sophisticated conventional weapons, some of these forces

are developing potential combat capabilities that compare favor-

able with those of industrialized nations. The growth and modern-

ization of African military forces may be attributed directly to

several political developments in the region and the conflicts

they have engendered. These include the continued challenge of

South Africa.

The evolution of regional powers worldwide also applies to

Africa.[6] Already a few states on the continent have emerged as

regional powers, and I believe this trend will continue. What is

less clear is whether their emergence is likely to have a positive

or negative effect on conflict resolution. As key states consoli-

date their power and establish effective regional leadership, they

could serve as a force for peace and stability. On the other

hand, they could touch off new rivalries, new conflicts, and com-

petition among indigenous states in a search for patron/client

8

relationships. Five countries are recognized as current regional powers: South Africa, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and Ethiopia. Aside from these big powers, a number of other countries have some potential to develop as military powers in their respective areas: Zaire, Zimbabwe and Senegal. However, there is a wide divergence of opinion, with some arguing that Tanzania already is a regional power, and others advocating the military potential of countries such as Kenya and Cameroon.

Future African Armies. An army is basically an instrument of power at the national level and consequently reflects the elements of national power.[7] An army's mandate is to be organized, trained and equipped for prompt and sustained combat operation, either to defend the nation against an external foe or to assist the government in preserving internal order. Force development involves identifying a threat and designing a force structure capable of defeating that threat with the existing personnel and material constraints. Once a capability is established, it is necessary to sustain it through an organization that is capable of regaining and replacing necessary supplies and resources. The military threat confronting each African nation should largely determine the need for the army as well as the kind of army needed.

African doctrine must be based on African missions and effective African models. Too much emphasis is being placed on acquiring sophisticated equipment and firepower that are likely to prove unreliable in combat, given existing maintenance and resupply capability as well as the type of terrain. Manpower and equipment inventories provide only the roughest indicator of military

development. Increases in manpower and hardware seldom signify comparable increases in effectiveness in the African context. In fact, a decrease in the size of an African army is often a better indication of increased effectiveness because it often marks the end of a period in which the army was an armed welfare organization. For example, the reduction in size of the Nigerian army has enhanced its effectiveness by creating a more functional organization.

Armies must be understood in the context of the environment in which they operate or in which they aspire to operate. To move forward, therefore, Africa must first develop the forces that already exist in a controlled, planned effort.[8] The U.S. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff defines "military capability" as the ability to achieve specified wartime objectives (e.g., win a battle or destroy a target) that includes four major components: force structure, readiness, modernization and sustainability. In rough order of importance, the following appear to be the key ingredients of military capability in African states.[9]

Human Resources: Skills, Leadership and Morale. Modern military forces are complex organizations that require specialists as well as leaders capable of coordinating and motivating them. Obtaining adequate numbers of specialists from riflemen to radar repairmen to planners entails not only elaborate training programs, but also command and organizational procedures that will deploy and use skills effectively, and that will maintain and refurbish them over time. Whatever the overall level of skills

and training within a state's armed forces, effective leadership is required to deploy resources effectively.

An Army is people. Sufficient numbers of quality soldiers must be recruited and retained. This force must also be properly trained and deployed. The quality of life provided the soldiers must be assured at some acceptable level, given their ability to act forcefully upon their grievances. A regularly paid and adequately housed soldier, secure in the knowledge that his family is well cared for, promises to be a more dependable, disciplined soldier.

Logistics: Supply and Maintenance. Shortages of skilled personnel and managerial talents probably are felt most severely in the field of logistics.[10] Combat cannot be sustained without a well-developed logistics system. Feeding, clothing, housing, paying, and nursing large numbers of people as well as supplying, fueling, repairing, calibrating, and replacing their equipment is a complex task. Moreover, the poor communications infrastructure and the difficult terrain and climatic conditions characteristic of most of the continent add to the difficulties African armies face in moving and supporting men and material.

Mobility and Firepower. Rapid mobility of forces and firepower is likely to be particularly highly prized for three reasons. First, as African armies become better established, their tasks are likely to be expanded beyond that of simply protecting the capital, a few other urban areas, and a few fixed border points. Second, recent important military confrontations in Africa have turned largely on questions of mobility. The

conflicts in Chad, the Ogaden, and the western Sahara, and above all, the performance of the Rhodesian (Zimbabwe) and South African armies have provided powerful demonstrative effects of how important it is to have modern equipment capable of moving men and firepower quickly. The lessons have not been lost on other countries. Third, Nigeria has discovered the advantages of substantial long-range transport capability. Increased mobility of forces will, in turn, likely led to a defensive response in the form of demand for ground-to-air and ground-to-ground heat-seeking and guided missiles, thus increasing the overall demand for new and fancier equipment.

There are, moreover, firm technical reasons for African armies to seek some of the very latest weapons systems. Not only are those able to move faster and farther and to strike harder than previous generations of weapons, they are easier to operate. Furthermore, because these systems are modularized, or like the LAW antitank weapon, designed to be thrown away after use, maintenance in the field is simple. Fewer highly trained maintenance personnel would thus be required near the battlefield.

Manpower. Although sheer size of one or another force rarely plays a decisive role in African military engagements, availability of manpower does offer an advantage. Personnel requirements balloon once a decision is taken to establish a specialized unit such as armor, artillery, or air transport. An array of secondary and tertiary personnel is essentially for supporting the new unit. Moreover, tanks are most effective if used in conjunction with

12

mechanized infantry, artillery, and, if possible, close air support units.

As in other regions of the world, a sense of threat is probably the most important catalyst for augmenting the size of military organizations in African states. The greater the perceived external or internal threat to a regime, the more likely it is to expand its armed forces despite economic costs and political risks. Although increases in African military capabilities have not been as dramatic as might be suggested by changes in personnel strengths and equipment inventories, several countries have gradually improved the combat effectiveness of their armed forces in recent years. These rising military capabilities will have consequences for both domestic and international politics. Other factors such as command and control, communication, or intelligence are, of course, important, but they seem less potent in distinguishing the capable from the incapable than do the five main elements.

To summarize, combat effectiveness or capability is a complex product of good leadership, training, morale, and discipline as well as the quality and quantity of arms and equipment an army can field. The elements of military capability are closely interrelated and difficult to separate even unanalytically. Leadership has a crucial impact on all aspects of military operations. Troop morale, skill and leadership are heavily dependent upon logistical supply. Morale is also affected by firepower, modern weapons being objects of pride and esprit de corps. Logistics and mobility are mutually dependent; poorly maintained trucks soon

become more of a burden than a help, and a well-organized supply depot is useless if troops in the field cannot be fed because of vehicle shortages. Firepower, likewise, depends upon a constant supply of fuel, ammunition, and spare parts, not to mention skilled personnel. Beyond their interconnection, the elements of military capability are affected by domestic and international political considerations.

Future Warfare. The type of warfare in Africa will also change.[11] Up to now, unconventional guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations have been by far the most frequent form of military conflict. Conventional warfare will become a more prominent feature of the African scene because more conflicts will occur between established governments, and interstate contests will be the most significant form of war in Africa.

The guerrilla wars that have beset Africa for decades are themselves becoming more conventional. That is, they have tended to develop conventional dimensions. To some degree this can be explained as part of a normal progression from the early stages of an armed insurgency, to the more set-piece clashes of the late stages. The availability of modern weapons, training and host nation support has, in the African situation, tended to short-circuit or at least accelerate this process. In Namibia and southern Angola, for example, the increasing use of sophisticated weapons by both the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas and South African counterguerrilla forces have increased casualty figures. The SWAPO insurgents use ground-to-air missiles and multiple rocket launchers, while the government

14

uses more air power. In Ethiopia insurgents are organized into larger conventional-type formations. The Tigre People's Liberation Front conducted conventional operations of brigade strength.

African warfare in general will become more orthodox, if not more sophisticated, by world standards. This will raise the prospect of greater damage to the participating countries as heavier, more devastating weapons are brought into play. The future conflicts will be categorized as low intensity, conventional wars. Classical interstate conflict has already gone from irredentist warfare to invasion. Low-intensity conventional wars will become more common, especially as the influence and effectiveness of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) wanes.

ENDNOTES

4. Bruce E. Arlinghaus, Military Development In Africa: The Political and Economic Risks of Arms Transfers, pp. 17-18.

5. Ibid., p. 16.

6. Ibid., pp. 106-107.

7. Bruce E. Arlinghaus and Pauline H. Baker, African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities, p. 114.

8. Ibid., p. 116.

9. William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen, Arms and Africa, pp. 102-103.

10. Ibid., pp. 111-113.

11. William G. Thom, Sub-Sahara Africa's Changing Military Environment, pp. 28-29.

CHAPTER IV

FUTURE MILITARY CHALLENGES

Today no single African state can claim deeply rooted unin-
terrupted political traditions.[12]   Most states are the relatively
recent creation of the 1884-1885 Berlin conference, which parti-
tioned Africa among European nations. Unfortunately, the geo-
political boundaries that resulted from this conference did not
take into account traditional boundaries, both social and politi-
cal, between ethnic groups. To take one example, an agreement
was made between Belgium and Britain that the Uganda-Congo (now
Zaire) border would be along "Meridian 30." As a result of such
straight-line policies, a number of ethnic groups were divided. A
few instances will illustrate this point: Greater Somalia was
divided between Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia; the Ewe
between Togo and Ghana; and the Yoruba between Nigeria and
Dahomay. On the other hand, ethnic groups with different values
were brought together. In Nigeria, for example, of the three main
ethnic groups brought together, the Yorubas cherished a tradi-
tional system of government built on principles of limited
monarchy; the Ibos had a system of government that could be
likened to representative democracy today; and the traditional
Hausa-Fulani held theocratic values. This illustration shows the
heterogeneity of the colonial states.

Domestic Conflict. At the time of independence, ethnicity
had played a salient role in determining the acquisition of
political power and the distribution and redistribution of public

16

goods in Africa. Unfortunately, by its very nature, ethnicity cannot encompass all the peoples in a heterogeneous state. Ethnic pluralism is a common aspect of modern African states. To the extent that certain groups feel impotent, dispossessed, and neglected in the distribution of power and public goods, they are likely to experience considerable frustration. If such frustrations are not creatively contained or assuaged, they will tend to result in crises, violent clashes, civil wars, rebellion, assassinations, military coups, and other manifestations of instability.

A few examples will illustrate the demands for self-determination in Nigeria which ended in the Biafra war. There had been considerable rivalry between the Housa-Fulani in the north, the Ibos in the east, and the Yorubas in the west.[13] The Sudanese war, another tragic event, affected the African continent for 17 years. The southern Sudanese have described it as "a struggle against internal colonialism." The cause of this war can be explained in terms of cultural diversity, ethnic mixture, different colonial experience and geography. The north is predominately Arab; the south is tied to Sub-Saharan Africa. From a religious perspective, President Mobutu Sese Seko succeeded in deflating the mystique surrounding the Christian faith by making it mandatory to use local names.[14] But religion has not been a serious factor in Zaire politics. In Ruanda and Burundi, continued ethnic confrontations between Hutu and Tutzi have claimed lives and destroyed property. Chad, too, has suffered intense conflicts based on ethnic and religious differences, with factional leaders using private armies to compete for power.

17

With this background, it is understandable that even the more stable countries have trouble controlling the smallest disruptive elements. Zambian forces chased the bandit, Mushala Gang, for seven years before putting a stop to his maraudings. A more significant sort of domestic threat stems from the fundamental cleavages in the society. The Sudan illustrates this case perfectly.[15] Its society is divided between Arabs and Africans, between the west and the riverine communities of the Nile, and among Africans of different ethnicity and religions in the south. In other states, significant subnational units continue to fester as potential secessions, and the best way to handle them vary widely. In some cases, it may be imperative to treat the group's traditional structure deferentially (as with the Mossi in Burkina Faso [Upper Volta]); in others, more aggressive treatment is necessary (as with the Baganda at the hands of the Ugandan ruler). In all cases, however, regimes should make serious, noncoercive efforts to gain the group's allegiance to the larger state.

Inter-Africa Conflicts. The trend toward greater military capability is certain to have an effect on the level of conflict as military-political relationships between states are altered, and as more countries become capable of conducting modest military campaigns.[16] The means to engage in armed conflict and to project power into neighboring states is on the rise. Conflicts will continue to occur between African states, which will be better prepared to engage in hostilities.

Several analysts see military growth itself as contributing toward more armed confrontation. Some believe that since the

'd-1970s there has been a militarization of Africa, a condition that has resulted in a proclivity to seek solutions by violent means. Others believe that with Africa at a most difficult stage of development, quarrels within a country or between countries are more likely to erupt into open conflict.

The availability of more military power not only increases the likelihood that it will be used, but also that the parameters of armed conflict will widen. Regional conflicts in Africa have been increasing in scope and intensity. In part, this is because African nations now have the material and logistical base to translate their disagreements into armed conflict. Armies can now sustain warfare for a longer time and over a wider area. Moreover, African countries with territorial demands on other countries, or ongoing political conflicts with their neighbors, appear more willing to act militarily. The alarming profusion of more sophisticated weapons and greater expenditures on arms will intensify the scale of such conflicts. More capable armed forces will have the capacity to increase their scope as well. The regional powers will be able to project their influence militarily. They will be quite capable of going into neighboring countries.

Recent examples of military intervention in regional conflict are illustrated in these points:[17] The Somalia invasion of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 1977-78; the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda in 1979; the Senegalese intervention in the Gambia; the Libyan occupation of northern Chad in 1984; Zimbabwe's frequent raids into Mozambique; and South Africa's ventures into Angola, Botswana, and Mozambique.

The final source of intra-African conflict has been the frequent failure of the OAU to mediate ongoing disputes between African states, to affect a satisfactory degree of regional defense cooperation, and to mount an effective African peacekeeping force which would pro-vide the means for enforcing its mediating efforts and form the operational basis for an African defense force.

International Conflict. The degree of external intervention, whether from other African countries or outside powers, might be expected to correlate logically with the scale of the conflict. No doubt persistent ethnic, religious, territorial and ideological conflicts will provide attractive openings for outside powers who would intervene to gain political leverage in the region. An increase in military conflicts will create more opportunities for outside involvement.[18] Rival African forces in local struggles tend to seek foreign support to strengthen their own position. This can cause an internationalization of local conflicts depending on how the outside powers see their own interests. Outside powers still retain a capability for direct involvement if important national interests are believed at stake. They could play more subtle roles short of direct intervention or involvement through surrogates. The Congo (now Zaire) of the 1960s offers a classic case of the despicable opportunities that ethnicity offers to foreign powers interested in destabilization of a country when Belgium supported Tshombe's efforts to establish an independent Katanga (Shaba), which resulted in civil war and a UN peacekeeping effort in the then Congo.

ENDNOTES

12. Bruce E. Arlinghaus, African Security Issues: Sovereignty, Stability, and Solidarity, pp. 141-142.

13. Ibid., p. 145.

14. Ibid., p. 153.

15. Bruce E. Arlinghaus and Pauline H. Baker, African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities, pp. 37-38.

16. William G. Thom, Sub-Saharan Africa's Changing Military Environment, pp. 9-10.

17. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

18. Ibid., p. 26.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

African armies were created by the colonialists to protect colonizers against rebellion by the colonized. After independence, armies were expected to perform two functions: external defense and maintenance of internal security. The post-independence military has proved more effective than the traditional armies, particularly those which have the resources and which have been preoccupied with the acquisition of weapons and the build-up of their armed forces with the dedication of converts. Their armies will grow larger and stronger and thereby more deadly, while the sources of interstate conflict remain unsolved. With the growing weakness of the OAU, a regional approach to conflict resolution will most likely be diminished, and bilateral conflicts will become more explosive and have the potential to spread throughout the region.

Most African armies will grow through the remainder of the century in response to increased threat perceptions. In some cases, this growth will vary widely from country to country. The growing disparity in military capability between African states increases the chances of seeking military resolution. As African states become more differentiated by wealth, power, and military capability, more conflict can be expected between them. Military power is the main component of this trend which is changing the African interstate system as well as the military environment. The prominent regional powers will be capable of waging

~ventional warfare on a significant scale within the local area, and of going into neighboring countries.

Tensions between a number of African states are evident, and these states cannot avoid being appropriately prepared to protect their own country. No African state can be sure that each time it asks for external power intervention, the request will automatically be acceeded to. In recognition of this problem, African states appear to have accepted the cardinal law in international politics that the national security of each state can only be guaranteed by the state itself and that means the acquisition and maintenance of military power.

Good preparation also involves improving the quality of the military organization. Sound educational programs and recruitment processes are a first step, and programs to enhance esprit de corps are also required. Force structure consists of the manpower and material resources of units and organizations assembled to perform a mission. An army is people. Sufficient numbers of quality soldiers must be recruited and retained. This force must also be properly trained and deployed. Further, as events in Liberia demonstrated in 1980, the quality of life provided the soldiers must be ensured at some acceptable level, given their ability to act forcefully upon their grievances. A regularly paid and adequately housed soldier, secure in the knowledge that his family is well-cared for, promises to be a more dependable, disciplined soldier.

An African defense is an idea worth the effort. African states have enough to worry about without the expensive addition

23

of a sophisticated jet-fighter squadron. African states may require two forces: a professional, warfighting organization, modeled on those of other states, and a paramilitary civic action force built on a model similar to those found in Israel and Indonesia. However, this approach could result in a proliferation of rival forces or in the development of elite units controlled by the ruling class. The type of warfare in Africa will also change. Conventional warfare will become a more prominent feature of the African scene because more conflicts will occur between established governments and because these interstate contests will be among the most significant wars in Africa.

This dynamic, more threatening environment confronts the African military forces with a series of challenges that go beyond their traditional responsibility for national defense. They must deal with the expansion and development of their own institutions. They must resolve internal cleavages that mirror those of their societies, they must deal with the aftermath of conflict, such as absorbing surrendered enemy troops from either civil war or conventional war. They must continue to define their proper role in the economic development and political modernization process, finding ways to contribute to them, yet removing themselves from direct interference or participation. Finally, they must, by their professionalism and capability, deter or defuse potential conflicts, whether internal or external in origin.

Modernization involves the technological upgrading of forces, units, weapons systems, and equipment. This category includes improvement in overall military capability through the acquisition

nd introduction of new items of equipment. Weapons are ulti-
mately tools. Although it is better to have the latest tools and
have them in larger numbers than the enemy, weapons count for
little in the hands of ill-trained troops controlled by officers
incapable of grasping the weapon's tactical uses. In a crisis,
weapons can be delivered rapidly, but the trained and experienced
manpower to operate and maintain them cannot be created overnight.
In large measure, the Cuban presence in both Angola and Ethiopia
evolved from this military reality.

One of the goals of African armies is force modernization.
However, modernization can be achieved only if morale, discipline,
and some basic level of unit readiness exist. Overall readiness
results from the cumulative effects of manning, equipping, train-
ing, and maintaining the ability to deploy and sustain a force.
Modernization is a two-edged sword in the African context. On the
one hand, there is the need to update the old structures, doc-
trines, facilities and skills in order to accommodate the new
weapons; on the other hand, the old weapons systems must be phased
out. A suitable approach is one adopted by Malawi and Botswana--
effective use of the old while incrementally adding the new. The
utility of a new weapon or equipment system results from a complex
interaction between manpower and professionally oriented training
and leadership. The Ugandan army under President Idi Amin had
mechanized with the assistance of Libya and others. But without a
coherent strategy or docrine and without effective leadership to
guide its use, Amin's technological advantage was an illusion, as

the Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF) demonstrated in the Tanzania-Uganda war.

The differences that have divided African states have by no means defeated their desire to cooperate. The fundamental problem is that their weakness causes a power vacuum that will not be ignored by countries eager to use Africa for strategic or economic advantage. Africa's raw materials and strategic position make it a target for great powers, former colonial countries, and smaller powers. The most effective way to fill the vacuum would be to create and maintain credible mobile peacekeeping forces with responsibility to defend the member states' sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. With the failure of OAU, Africa must look at a conflict suppression mechanism that has been an African goal since independence. A greater need exists for an African peacekeeping force to help police the continent. Such a force may be more regionally oriented than continental, perhaps constructed around a regional organization such as the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS). No doubt, persistent ethnic, religious, territorial and ideological conflicts will provide attractive openings for outside powers who would intervene to gain political leverage in the region.

Defense cooperation among African states is encouraging because there are important benefits to be gained. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere stated in 1977 that "not a single African country is really a military threat to South Africa." His statement is still correct in 1989 and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Effective defense against South Africa absolutely

depends on strategic and tactical cooperation. African states should have a conventional plan for control. Libya, South Africa, and perhaps other states are motivated to join the nuclear ranks, and even if the other African states plan to use "world opinion" as their first line of defense, the coordinated ability to know about and to point out potential threats will help them protect themselves. A second reason for cooperation lies in African states' mutual dealings. As they improve the quality of their national defense organizations, they may be more tempted to change by force some of the anachronistic legacies left by remote colonial mapmakers in 1884 and 1885.

A worthwhile goal, though hard to achieve at best, would be a continental defense command structure that could maintain credible and mobile counterinsurgency forces. The developing concept of an African High Command is not new and has been documented elsewhere. Continental defense forces could safeguard minorities until regional autonomy or other solutions can be worked out between the central government and minority groups. The longer it takes to solve such problems, the more likely will be outside intervention and the erosion of the state's legitimacy. Chad's turmoil illustrates this lesson. Chad's internal tensions are certainly real ones, but outsiders have viewed them as opportunities to advance or protect their own interests. African military cooperation must improve before the continent considers the acqusition of nuclear and chemical capabilities.

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Table 1: Personnel Strength of African Armed Forces
(Regular Forces and Paramilitary Personnel)

Country	Population 1989	Regular Forces 1975	Regular Forces 1982	Regular Forces 1989	Paramilitary or Reserve 1989
Algeria	24,794,777	63,000	168,000	170,000	30,500
Angola	9,560,000	7,000	35,000	100,000	50,000
Burundi	5,303,000	1,950	7,000	7,200	1,500
Cameroon	11,373,000	5,600	7,300	11,600	4,000
Cen. Afr. Rep.	2,949,000	2,000	2,300	6,500	2,700
Chad	5,443,000	1,950	4,200	17,000	5,700
Congo	1,907,000	5,500	9,525	8,750	6,100
Egypt	54,115,000	313,500	395,000	448,000	504,000
Ethiopia	47,344,000	53,000	230,000	255,500	*
Gabon	1,220,000	1,350	1,450	4,700	4,800
Ghana	15,253,000	18,000	18,500	11,600	5,000
Guinea Conakry	6,593,000	8,450	9,900	9,900	9,600
Ivory Coast	11,112,000	4,100	6,550	7,100	12,000
Kenya	23,389,000	9,020	14,750	23,600	4,000
Liberia	2,400,000	5,200	5,700	5,800	50,000
Libya	4,390,000	24,000	42,000	85,000	40,000
Malawi	7,983,000	1,600	5,000	7,250	1,000
Mali	9,072,000	4,200	4,950	7,300	7,800
Mauritania	2,125,000	1,300	7,970	14,470	--
Morocco	24,039,000	59,750	116,500	192,500	100,000
Mozambique	15,375,000	19,000	21,000	71,000	6,000
Niger	6,775,000	2,100	2,200	3,300	3,000
Nigeria	112,258,000	106,000	189,000	94,500	12,000
Ruanda	6,815,000	4,280	5,150	5,200	1,200
Senegal	7,138,000	6,000	9,560	9,700	--
Somalia	5,226,000	23,000	62,550	65,000	--
South Africa	35,364,000	50,570	63,000	103,000	425,000
Sudan	25,008,000	48,600	68,000	72,800	--
Tanzania	24,333,000	24,600	44,850	46,700	10,000
Togo	3,230,000	2,350	3,510	5,900	750,000
Tunisia	7,635,000	27,650	28,600	38,000	13,500
Uganda (a)	17,396,000	9,850	21,000	70,000	--
Zaire	34,000,000	46,000	22,100	26,000	25,000
Zambia	7,396,000	8,000	14,500	16,200	1,200
Zimbabwe	9,528,000	4,000	60,000	49,500	38,000

*   All citizens 18-50 do 6 months training.
--   Not exist or negligible.
(a) The sharp drop in the size of the armed forces in Zaire was
    due to a reduction of uniformed manpower of a 1977 reorganiza-
    tion that separated the National Gendermary from the military.

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military
          Balance, 1975-76, 1982-83, 1989-90.

Table 2: African Ground Order of Battle

Country	Tanks	Armored Cars APCs 1982 Recon. Veh.	Tanks 1989	Armored Cars APCS
Algeria	650	650	950	1,640
Angola	220	500	550	455
Burundi	--	29	--	32
Cameroon	--	18	--	69
Cen. Afr. Rep.	--	22	4	49
Chad	--	--	--	65
Congo	32	66	67	129
Egypt	1,680	3,900	2.400	3,695
Ethiopia	690	666	785	870
Gabon	--	37	--	84
Ghana	--	88	--	56
Guinea Conakry	40	65	58	65
Ivory Coast	5	--	5	52
Kenya	12	113	83	123
Liberia	--	12	--	10
Libya	3,100	2,460	2,280	2,260
Malawi	--	10	--	30
Mali	49	60	--	70
Mauritania	--	75	--	726
Morocco	509	1,150	527	1,418
Mozambique	350	250	150	264
Niger	--	43	--	54
Nigeria	114	119	232	565
Ruanda	--	12	--	28
Senegal	--	62	--	98
Somalia	190	450	303	519
South Africa	210	860	310	4,600
Sudan	315	552	295	593
Tanzania	96	50	96	65
Togo	--	46	11	82
Tunisia	62	228	172	255
Uganda	35	129	13	150
Zaire	50	284	50	179
Zambia	34	187	60	101
Zimbabwe	28	43	43	218

-- Not exist or negligible.

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance, 1982, 1989-90.

Kaleidoscope: Current World Data 1988 by ABC-Cl10, Inc., Santa Barbara, CA 93140-4339.

Table 3: African Air Order of Battle, 1989-1990

Country	Personnel	Fighter	COIN	Bombers	Helos	Transport
Algeria	12,000	14	2	na	48	115
Angola	7,000	93	8	na	133	74
Burundi	750	na	3	na	7	4
Cameroon	300	76	na	na	12	11
Cen. Afr. Rep.	300	na	na	na	2	5
Chad	200	na	4	na	5	15
Congo	500	21	na	na	5	11
Egypt	30,000	76	na	9	72	110
Ethiopia	4,000	738	na	na	53	16
Gabon	1,000	9	10	na	73	9
Ghana	800	na	6	na	7	13
Guinea Conakry	800	72	na	na	8	6
Ivory Coast	900	6	na	na	na	7
Kenya	3,500	12	5	na	57	32
Liberia	na	na	na	na	na	na
Libya	22,000	481	30	6	34	104
Malawi	150	na	na	na	5	7
Mali	400	27	na	na	3	6
Mauritania	250	na	11	na	4	8
Morocco	16,000	58	45	na	107	24
Mozambique	4,200	66	na	na	20	11
Niger	100	na	na	na	na	8
Nigeria	9,500	69	36	na	38	20
Ruanda	200	na	2	na	na	3
Senegal	500	na	9	na	7	9
Somalia	2,500	58	5	na	13	19
South Africa	11,000	263	na	15	136	44
Sudan	3,000	22	na	na	39	36
Tanzania	1,000	29	na	na	4	10
Togo	250	na	18	na	8	9
Tunisia	3,500	12	11	na	42	2
Uganda		na	na	na	22	2
Zaire	2,500	8	12	na	18	19
Zambia	1,200	25	41	na	22	16
Zimbabwe	2,500	65	16	na	26	25

na - Not available.

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance, 1989-90.

Kaleidoscope: Current World Data 1988 by ABC-Cll0, Inc., Santa Barbara, CA 93140-4339.